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| Jan 24, 2010 8:31 pm |
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re: re: re: Global issues - governance |
| abbeboulah
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I do not claim to have any practical, ready-to-be applied panacea for this question. I do have some hunches about the general direction in which answers might be found, but I think that a significantly greater fraction of the resources now devoted to weapons development and research aimed at increasing the efficiency of government and business propaganda (advertising) needs to be applied to this problem.
About my hunches:
A
One main task would be the better control of power where it is still needed as the means of making institutions and governance entities work effectively. While the traditional control has been through either the rule system in a hierarchy (which leaves the question open about the top guy in the hierarchy), time limits on the power position, and balance of power arrangements. Most of these controls work (and apply the sanctions aiming at compliance) after the fact -- which in this age is arguably ‘too late’.
So is it possible to invent arrangements whereby the resources (money, communication) to implement power activities are ‘released’ and made available to the person ‘holding’ or being given power only if and to the extent the activity is compatible with the rules and agreements established for that position? A very low-level technology example would be the device that does not let a driver start a car engine when it senses that the driver is under the influence. Which might be expanded to including a sensor in that device for the applicable speed limits etc. on the road, deactivating the ‘license’ upon too many violations. The point here being that the ‘government control’ of detecting and sanctioning violations -- now the expensive, cumbersome and often dangerous highway police force which also is not immune to temptations of power abuse, would no longer be necessary (for this particular problem). I think it might be possible to apply the underlying principle here to the problem of control of power.
Another approach for this would be to recognize power as a human ‘need’ of sorts -- and then, like most other needs, having people pay for the satisfaction of that need; the payment would be scaled to the possible severity of consequences of flawed, misguided (stupid), only self-serving, or criminal abuse of the power ‘license’. The currency for this might be discussed -- consider your ‘five currencies’ (I thing we could add some) that might be used as the ‘damage deposits’ for this.
B
The other aspect for this has to do with the application of sanctions for the violation of agreements such as abstaining from the application of military or economic force in negotiating mutual trade or other kinds of arrangements (I have suggested before that cooperative planning requires such agreements simply because application of force or coercion logically does not contribute to the quality and mutual acceptability of plans, the acceptance of which relies, or should rely, on the merit of the arguments exchanged that explore, assert, and seek to strengthen the claims of plausibility and desirability of the plan features).
Ideally, the application of such sanctions should be ‘automatic’ (just like the deactivation of drunk driver’s ignition) and triggered by the very attempt at violation. This is not as outrageously utopian a concept as it may seem. Among older approximation arrangements was the exchange of hostages among societies verging on war: the sneaky attack by one side would trigger the execution of the others’ hostages. Which of course should be ‘high value’ ones -- the son of the other side’s ruler, for example. Would it be possible to exchange, as guarantees of compliance, the main switches for the other side’s military communication system on the respectively other president’s desk, linked to the sensors of initiated attacks? Or switching off all the TV soap opera and sports channels (which could trigger an immediate revolution in the afflicted country)? Joke aside -- the grim joke of the MAD system that for all its madness may be credited for having kept the cold war from going hot for decades, was based on a similar principle. Is it not possible to invent less lethal and mad but still effective versions? As means to guarantee adherence to mutual non-coercive agreements among the many parties and entities in the world, if we can’t find an good solution for problem A above, to keep a world ‘policeman’ governance entity from abusing the power that it would have to have to prevent the biggest bullies from riding roughshod over weaker countries: to keep such a government from itself becoming a bully?
As I said, I don’t claim to have perfect ready-made answers. But I think we desperately need to start working on developing them. The problem applies to military conflicts, to trade agreements, to financial markets, to environmental sustainability, all interactions between contirs. I concur with the people who worry about a world government: currently I don’t see effective guarantees against it becoming a bully. The EC, well-intentioned as it is (or was) has been doing fine in avoiding force among its members, but the bullying-by-bureaucracy has become very counterproductive and is turning many former supporters against it. However, as far as I can see, nobody has any good, convincing answers for what to do instead.
Private Reply to abbeboulah (new win) |
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